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Abstract. First, this article considers the nature of quantum reality (the reality responsible for 
quantum phenomena) and the concept of realism (our ability to represent this reality) in quantum 
theory, in conjunction with the roles of locality, causality, and probability and statistics there. 
Second, it offers two interpretations of quantum mechanics, developed by the authors of this 
article, the second of which is also a different (from quantum mechanics) theory of quantum 
phenomena. Both of these interpretations are statistical. The first interpretation, by A. Plotnitsky, 
“the statistical Copenhagen interpretation,” is nonrealist, insofar as the description or even 
conception of the nature of quantum objects and processes is precluded. The second, by A. 
Khrennikov, is ultimately realist, because it assumes that the quantum-mechanical level of reality 
is underlain by a deeper level of reality, described, in a realist fashion, by a model, based in the 
pre-quantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT), the predictions of which reproduce those 
of quantum mechanics. Moreover, because the continuous fields considered in this model are 
transformed into discrete clicks of detectors, experimental outcomes in this model depend on the 
context of measurement in accordance with N. Bohr’s interpretation and the statistical 
Copenhagen interpretation, which coincides with N. Bohr’s interpretation in this regard.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This article proceeds along two lines of inquiry. First, it considers the nature of quantum reality 
(the nature of objects and processes that are responsible for observed quantum phenomena) and 
various forms of realism (ways of representing this reality) in quantum theory.1 Second, it offers 
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1 The concepts of reality and realism will be explained in Section 2. By “quantum phenomena” 
we refer to those observable physical phenomena in considering which Planck’s constant, h, 
must be taken into account, although, as will be seen below, these phenomena themselves may 
be described by means of classical physics. Quantum objects, which are responsible for the 
appearance of quantum phenomena, could be macroscopic, although their quantum nature would 
be defined by their ultimate microscopic constitution and hence by the role of h in the 
corresponding phenomena. (We discuss the difference between objects and phenomena in 
quantum physics below). By “quantum theory” we refer collectively to theories accounting for 
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two interpretations of quantum mechanics, developed by the two authors of this article. (The 
second of these interpretations also arises from a different overall theory of quantum 
phenomena.) 
The main questions at stake in the first, more general, line of our argument are a) whether it 
is possible to represent the ultimate nature of reality responsible for quantum phenomena, and b) 
whether quantum mechanics, in its standard version, is a realist theory. These questions came 
into the foreground early in the history of quantum mechanics, especially in the famous 
confrontation between A. Einstein and N. Bohr, which has shaped the subsequent debate 
concerning quantum mechanics and its interpretation. This debate still continues with 
undiminished intensity. Einstein argued that quantum mechanics is incomplete because it does 
not describe, at least not completely, individual quantum objects and processes, analogously to 
the way classical mechanics or relativity does, at least ideally and in principle, for the objects and 
processes it considers. We will term this concept of completeness “the Einstein completeness.” 
Bohr counter-argued that, while Einstein’s claim may be true, and while it is strictly true in 
Bohr’s and related interpretations in, as W. Heisenberg called it, “the Spirit of Copenhagen” [1, 
p. iv], such as the statistical Copenhagen interpretation proposed in Section 4 of this article, 
quantum mechanics may be seen as complete in a different sense. It is as complete as nature 
allows a theory of quantum phenomena to be within the proper scope of quantum mechanics, at 
least as things stand now (a crucial qualification assumed by Bohr and throughout this article), 
insofar as quantum mechanics correctly predicts the outcomes of all quantum experiments 
performed thus far. We term this concept of completeness “the Bohr completeness.” 
It is true, and was part of Einstein’s concern, that, unlike those of classical mechanics and 
classical electrodynamics, or of relativity, where it is possible to predict the outcomes of 
individual physical processes (ideally) exactly, in quantum mechanics these predictions are, in 
general, probabilistic or statistical even in dealing with elemental individual quantum processes 
and events. This, however, is strictly in accord with what is actually observed, because 
identically prepared quantum experiments, in general lead to different outcomes [e.g., 2, v. 2, p. 
73]. There is no kind of quantum event concerning which even ideally exact predictions are 
rigorously possible. It may be a matter of interpretation whether one could assign probabilities to 
the outcomes of individual quantum experiments or could only deal with the statistics of 
(multiple) repeated experiments, an alternative considered below. However, the generally 
probabilistic nature of quantum predictions is not in question, again, as things stand now, even if 
one offers an Einstein-complete theory of quantum objects and processes, such as one or another 
form of Bohmian mechanics, or of some deeper underlying dynamics, such as A. Khrennikov’s 
model proposed here. The question, then, becomes whether nature will at some point allow us to 
have an Einstein-complete theory of quantum phenomena. Einstein thought it should. Bohr 
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quantum phenomena, among them the “standard quantum mechanics” (introduced by W. 
Heisenberg and E. Schrödinger in 1925-1926), henceforth designated as “quantum mechanics,” 
in contradistinction, for example, to “Bohmian mechanics,” which is a mathematically different 
theory, rather than a different interpretation of quantum mechanics. By “quantum physics” we 
refer to the totality of quantum phenomena and quantum theories. These concepts technically 
include high-energy (relativistic) quantum theories and physics, which will not be considered 
here. The terms “classical phenomena,” “classical mechanics,” “classical theory,” and “classical 
physics,” will be used in parallel. We are only concerned, in considering locality, with special 
relativity, and henceforth “relativity” refers to special relativity, unless stated otherwise.  
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thought it might not, which is not the same as it never will but which, Bohr contended, would at 
least diminish the force of Einstein’s criticism [e.g., 2, v. 2, p. 57]. 
At a certain stage of this debate, in the 1930s, the question of locality was injected into it, due 
to several thought experiments proposed by Einstein, especially those of the EPR (Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen) type, first presented in the famous paper of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. 
Rosen (EPR) [3].2 By using these experiments, Einstein argued that quantum mechanics could be 
considered as offering a complete description of the physical reality of individual quantum 
processes only if quantum mechanics or nature itself is nonlocal. Bohr counter-argued that, even 
given these experiments, quantum mechanics could be shown to be both complete, by his 
criterion (Bohr-complete), and local [4].3 As did Einstein, Bohr ruled out the nonlocality of 
nature, again, at least on the basis of the evidence available thus far, which is one of the reasons 
why neither of them saw Bohmian mechanics (introduced in 1952) as a viable alternative. Bohr’s 
argument, thus, left open the question whether a more complete and specifically an Einstein-
complete local theory is possible, a question that remains open. Eventually, especially in the 
wake of the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems, the question of locality, rather than of 
completeness, came to dominate the debate concerning quantum phenomena and quantum 
theory. However, because realism has remained a major concern, in particular given the lack of 
realism as a possible alternative to nonlocality, the question of completeness and the suitable 
criteria of completeness have remained germane to this debate as well. Indeed these theorems 
sharpened and gave more rigorous sense to the question of the completeness of quantum 
mechanics, and (in our terms here) the difference between Einstein completeness and Bohr 
completeness in considering it. 
In sum, the quantum-mechanical situation may be seen as essentially shaped by three 
interrelated questions, each defined by a cluster of main concepts—(1) reality, realism, and 
completeness; (2) randomness and causality, and hence probability and statistics; and (3) 
locality. The corresponding assumptions and alternatives, such as realism vs. locality, define 
different interpretations of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, or of the Bell and 
Kochen-Specker theorems and related findings pertinent to quantum foundations.4  
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2 We explain “locality” in more detail in the next section. For the moment, at stake is primarily 
the compatibility with (special) relativity, prohibiting an “action at a distance” (a physical 
influence propagating faster than the speed of light in a vacuum). 
3 For a detailed analysis of the exchange see [5, pp. 237-312]. 
4 It is not possible to survey these interpretations here. Just as does the Copenhagen interpretation 
(one could think of several even in Bohr’s own case), each rubric, on by now a long list (e.g.. the 
many-worlds, consistent-histories, modal, relational, transcendental-pragmatist, and so forth), 
contains numerous versions, which, however, revolve around the concepts just listed. The 
literature dealing with the subject is immense, although standard reference sources, such as 
Wikipedia [6], would list the most prominent ones. Given the role of the statistical considerations 
in this article, we might mention a compelling statistical interpretation proposed in [7], which has 
certain affinities with the statistical Copenhagen interpretation proposed here, again, 
acknowledging that there is a large number of other statistical interpretations available, difficult 
to survey here. The literature is nearly as immense when it comes to the Bell and the Kochen-
Specker theorems and related findings. We will not be concerned with these problematics here. 
Among the standard treatments are [8, 9, 10]. We might add that they have been extensively 
discussed at Växjö conferences, and the proceedings of these conferences contain important 
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Both the interpretations of quantum mechanics to be offered in this article are statistical. The 
first interpretation, by A. Plotnitsky, “the statistical Copenhagen interpretation,” is statistical 
because in this interpretation quantum mechanics is seen as a theory that only statistically 
predicts the data observed in repeated (identically prepared) experiments, rather than the 
probabilities of single experiments, which probabilities cannot, in general, be assigned in this 
interpretation. The second interpretation, by A. Khrennikov, is statistical, first, in the same sense 
as the statistical Copenhagen interpretation and, second, insofar as it is based in the “pre-
quantum classical statistical field theory” (PCSFT). Thus, at stake in Khrennikov’s overall 
mathematical model is also a different theory of quantum phenomena, rather than only a 
different interpretation of quantum mechanics, underlined by this theory. 
These two interpretations are different as concerns their respectively nonrealist and realist 
nature. The first is strictly nonrealist because in this interpretation a description or, more 
radically (Bohr does not appear to claim as much, at least expressly), even a conception of the 
ultimate nature of quantum objects and processes is, in Bohr’s words, “in principle excluded” [2, 
v. 2, p. 62]. It is also not entirely clear whether Bohr had subscribed to the view, adopted by the 
statistical Copenhagen interpretation, that one cannot even meaningfully assign probabilities to 
the outcomes of individual quantum processes and events. Given, however, that Bohr uniformly 
spoke of the statistical rather than probabilistic character of quantum predictions, and that he is 
very careful in choosing his terms, he might well have held this view. As will be seen, among the 
founding figures of quantum mechanics, W. Pauli appears to have expressly adopted this view. 
The second interpretation or, again, the model that enables it is realist because it assumes that 
the level of reality corresponding to that considered by quantum mechanics is underlain by a 
deeper level of reality, described by a classical-like field theory or model (PCSFT). This model 
reproduces quantum probabilities, because the continuous fields considered are transformed into 
discrete clicks of detectors. As a result, experimental outcomes in this model depend on the 
context of measurement just as they do in Bohr’s interpretation or in the statistical Copenhagen 
interpretation. It follows that, insofar as it is possible to speak of objectivity in either of these two 
interpretations, this objectivity is different from that found in classical physics or relativity, 
where objectivity is defined by the theory’s capacity to relate to the data pertaining to the 
corresponding objects and processes themselves independently of the context of measurement. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follow. Section 2 offers an outline of key concepts 
considered here. Section 3 revisits the Bohr-Einstein debate and presents Bohr’s interpretation of 
quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in Bohr’s ultimate version, which confirms that 
there is no single Copenhagen interpretation even in Bohr’s own case. As indicated above, 
however, it is possible to speak, with Heisenberg, of “the Spirit of Copenhagen” [1, p. iv]. 
Section 4 considers the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, by Plotnitsky, and Section 5 
Khrennikov’s PCSFT model and the interpretation of quantum mechanics based in it. 
 !
2. An Outline of Concepts 
 
This section outlines the key concepts used by this article, as these concepts will be understood 
here, because they could be understood otherwise. Although this outline cannot claim to capture 
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contributions to the subject, and most other foundational issues concerning quantum physics. It is 
worth keeping in mind that these theorems and most of these findings pertain to quantum data as 
such, and do not depend on quantum mechanics or any particular theory of these data.  
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all of the deeper physical and philosophical aspects of these concepts, it is sufficient for our 
purposes and, hopefully, for avoiding misunderstandings concerning these concepts and our use 
of them. We begin with the concept of concept itself, a term often used without further 
explanation in physics or even philosophy. As understood in this article, in part following 
Deleuze and Guattari [11], a concept is not a generalization from particulars (which commonly 
defines concepts) or merely a general or abstract idea, although a concept may contain such 
generalizations and abstract, including mathematical, ideas. A concept is a multi-component 
entity, defined by the specific organization of its components, which may be general or 
particular, and some of these components, indeed often the most important ones, are concepts in 
turn. It is the relational and hierarchical organization of these components that is most crucial in 
defining a concept. In practice, there is always a cut off in delineating a concept, which results 
from assuming some of the components of this concept to be primitive entities whose structure is 
not specified. These primitive concepts could, however, be specified by an alternative 
delineation, which would lead to a new overall concept, containing a new set of primitive, 
(provisionally) unspecified components. The history of a concept is often that of such 
progressive new delineations. 
The concept of a moving body in classical physics is an example of a multi-component 
physical concept. It involves multiple (idealized) elements related to its properties and behavior, 
beginning with the concept of motion, defined by such component concepts as position and 
velocity or momentum, mathematized by means of differential functions of real variables. This 
concept has its history as well, beginning with Aristotle’s concept of physical motion, lacking in 
mathematical architecture as it was. This architecture was introduced into the concept of motion 
by the modern classical physics of Galileo and Newton, as a mathematical-experimental science 
of nature, which changed this concept. This concept is very different from Bohr’s concept of a 
quantum object, the properties of which cannot be specified in the way they are in classical 
physics. This impossibility gives Bohr’s concept a special status insofar as this concept or, by 
extension, the quantum-level reality as understood here, has no conceptual architecture that is or 
could ever be associated with it. In Bohr’s interpretation, defined by this concept, the 
mathematical concepts comprising the formalism of quantum mechanics only relate, in terms of 
probabilistic or statistical predictions, to what is observed in measuring instruments, which or, 
more accurately, their observable parts, are described by means of classical physical concepts, 
thus allowing for realism at this level. As explained below, measuring instruments also have 
quantum (and hence, unobservable) parts through which they interact with quantum objects. 
We shall now define the concepts of reality and realism, actually two sets of concepts 
corresponding to these terms. These two sets of concepts are, we believe, sufficiently general to 
encompass most concepts of reality and realism currently used in physics and the philosophy of 
physics, and we will indicate some among more specific versions of both concepts, thus defined, 
as we proceed. By “reality” we refer to that which actually exists or is assumed to exist. In the 
case of physics, it is nature or matter, which is generally, but not always, assumed to exist 
independently of our interaction with it, and to have existed when we did not exist and to 
continue to exist when we will no longer exist. This is also true in Bohr’s and related 
interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen, such as the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, but 
in these cases in the absence of any description or even conception of the character of this 
existence, and hence of realism. What exists or is assumed to exist and how it exists is a matter 
of perspective, interpretation, and debate. 
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Claims concerning what exists and how it exists define the corresponding concepts of 
realism. It follows that, according to this definition, any form of realism is more than only a 
claim concerning the existence of something, such as physical objects, which we can describe, at 
least by means of idealized models, in classical physics, or quantum objects, about which 
nothing else could be said or even thought in Bohr’s or related interpretations. By realist theories 
we understand theories of the following two types. According to the first type of realism, a realist 
theory would offer a representation of the properties of the physical objects or systems of objects 
considered and their behavior, or sometimes, as in the so-called structural realism, of the 
structures defining such systems. In modern (post-Galilean) physics, generally, such a 
representation is given in or by the mathematical formalism of the theory. This representation 
may be and in modern physics usually is an idealized and specifically mathematized 
representation or model of the actual reality, which retains some of the features of the actual 
objects and processes considered and disregard others. Realist theories are sometimes called 
ontological theories, although the term “ontological” may carry additional philosophical 
connotations, with which we shall not be concerned here.5 One could, in principle, see claims 
concerning the existence of something to which a theory relate in any way, even without 
representing that something, as realism. However, placing this view of reality outside realism is 
consistent with a more common use of the term realism in physics and philosophy, and it is 
advantageous in the context of Bohr’s and related interpretations, defined by this concept of 
reality as “reality without realism.”  
According to the second type of realism, one would presuppose an independent architecture 
(which may be temporal) of reality governing this behavior, even if this architecture cannot be 
represented, idealized, by a theory either at a given point in history or perhaps ever, but if so, 
only due to practical limitations. In the first of these two eventualities, a theory that is merely 
predictive may be accepted for the lack of a realist alternative, but under the assumption that a 
future theory will do better, specifically by virtue of being a realist theory of the first type, just 
defined. Einstein held this view toward quantum mechanics, which he expected to be eventually 
replaced by such a realist theory, ideally, a field theory of a classical type, on the model of 
Maxwell’s electrodynamics, followed by Einstein’s general relativity.  
What unites both conceptions of realism and thus defines realism most generally is the 
assumption that this type of architecture exists independently of our interactions with it. In other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The description just given allows for different degrees to which our models “match” reality. For 
example, to what degree does the mathematical architecture of relativity correspond, even as an 
idealization, to the architecture of nature, as opposed to ultimately only serving as a 
mathematical model for correct predictions concerning relativistic phenomena? See [12]. Indeed, 
as Kant realized, these questions could be posed concerning classical mechanics, where, 
however, the descriptive idealizations used are more in accord with our phenomenal experience 
than in relativity or quantum theory. There is vast literature on the subject, which we cannot 
consider here. One might mention, however, E. Schrödinger’s account, arguably following H. 
Hertz, of “the physics of models” in classical physics in his cat-paradox paper, which addressed 
the limitations of our capacity to represent, to have a picture, Bild, of the ultimate reality even if 
the latter is assumed to be classical, which Schrödinger preferred it to be [13, pp. 152-153]. 
While he was thus close to Einstein in preferring the “classical ideal” to what transpired in 
quantum mechanics, he was more skeptical than Einstein as concerns the future of this ideal in 
fundamental physics.  
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words, realism is defined by an assumption, which defined Kant’s philosophy, that the ultimate 
constitution of nature possesses attributes that may be unknown or even unknowable, but that are 
thinkable, conceivable [14, p. 115]. In physics, this constitution is often deemed conceivable on 
the model of classical physics and its ideal of reality, possibly adjusted to accommodate new 
phenomena, such as electromagnetic or relativistic ones, and new concepts, such as field, 
classical or quantum, or more recently automata, including quantum automata [15,16]. This 
architecture is, more commonly than not, assumed to be approachable, along the lines of the first 
type of realism defined above, again, on the model of classical physics or relativity. At the very 
least, realism assumes that the concept of organization can in principle apply to this constitution, 
no matter how much off the mark anything we can specifically come up with at a given point in 
conceiving of this constitution may be. The hope is, however, that our theories can eventually 
capture something of this architecture in one way or another, to one degree or another, at one 
distance from reality or another. 
Interpretations of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics in the spirit of Copenhagen, 
such as that of Bohr or the statistical Copenhagen interpretation proposed here, not only do not 
make any of these assumptions concerning quantum objects or their behavior, but also disallow 
all of these assumptions. These interpretations, again, assume that quantum objects, or some 
entities in nature that we thus idealize as quantum objects, do exist independently of our 
interaction with them, are real, and that it is this existence or reality that is responsible, through 
this interaction, for the situation we encounter in quantum physics. In other words, the character 
of this existence is such that it preludes us from describing quantum objects and their behavior, 
or even from forming a conception of them. As indicated above, Bohr does not appear to have 
made or expressly stated the last strong claim, but this claim, which is part of the statistical 
Copenhagen interpretation, may be argued to be in the spirit of Copenhagen. The nonrealist 
argumentation just outlined (now including that of Bohr) is not simply “an arbitrary 
renunciation” of an analysis the ultimate constitution of nature [2, v. 2, p. 62]. It is an argument 
that, on the basis of its analysis of the nature of quantum phenomena and quantum theory, 
specifically quantum mechanics, is compelled to conclude that this constitution is beyond the 
reach of theoretical description or even thought itself, at least as things stand now. In this sense, 
one can speak of “reality without realism”: quantum objects may said to be real and, as such, 
have effects on the world we observe, and yet prevent us from representing them, specifically by 
the formalism of quantum theory, or possibly even from forming any conception concerning 
them.6 
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6 As noted earlier, once one allows for “reality” in this sense, one could, in principle, speak of 
“realism.” I. Hacking’s influential concept of “entity-realism” (vs. “theory realism”) [17] and 
some of its avatars, developed during the last decade in the philosophy of science and debates 
concerning the question of reality there (debates influenced by quantum theory), may be argued 
to be examples of this type of realism. These concepts do not appear to us to be quite as radical 
as the concept of “reality without realism,” insofar as they still appear to conform to Kant’s 
concept of noumena as, while unknowable, still in principle thinkable. As noted here, Bohr’s 
position could be interpreted in either direction. The subject would require a further discussion, 
which is beyond our scope here. It may be added that one could, following G. Berkeley, 
conversely, understand nonrealism as the denial of the existence of external reality altogether. 
While this concept, used by Berkeley against Newton, is not without relevance to quantum 
theory, it is rarely adopted in physics or philosophy, and will be not considered here.  
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There is still an ontology or realism associated with such interpretations. It is defined by the 
classical ontology of measuring instruments, which—that is, their observable parts—are 
described by classical physics and in which the outcomes of quantum experiments are registered 
as the effects of the interaction between quantum objects and these instruments. This interaction 
itself is quantum, and hence, it is not available to a realist treatment, but in each case, this 
interaction leaves, as its effect, a mark in a measuring instrument. This mark can then be treated 
as a part of a permanent record, which can be unambiguously defined, discussed, communicated, 
and so forth, and in this sense may be seen as objective. It is the specific character of these 
effects that compels nonrealist interpretations of quantum objects as entities that are beyond all 
description or even conception, as opposed to merely postulating this nature of quantum objects 
or what this concept idealizes. 
The lack of causality is an automatic consequence. As Schrödinger observed, by way of a 
very different assessment of this type of argumentation, which he saw as “a doctrine born of 
distress,” in his cat-paradox paper: “if a classical state does not exist at any moment, it can 
hardly change causally” [13, p.154]. We need, however, to define the concept of causality to 
which this assessment refers and that will be assumed here. In this view, “causality” is an 
ontological category (part of reality). It relates to the behavior of physical systems whose 
evolution is defined by the fact that the state of a given system is, at least at the level of idealized 
models, determined at all moments of time by their state at a particular moment of time, indeed 
at any given moment of time.7 By contrast, “determinism” is assumed here to be an 
epistemological category (part of our knowledge of reality) that denotes our ability to predict the 
state of a system, at least, again, as defined by an idealized model, exactly, rather than 
probabilistically, at any and all points once we know its state at a given point. Determinism is 
sometimes used in the same sense as causality, as defined here, and in the case of classical 
mechanics (which deals with single objects or a small number of objects), causality and 
determinism, as defined here, coincide. Once a system is large enough, one needs a superhuman 
power to predict its behavior exactly, as was famously noted by P. S. Laplace. 
However, while it follows automatically that noncausal behavior, considered at the level of a 
given model, cannot be handled deterministically, the reverse is not true. The underlined 
qualification is necessary because we can have causal models of processes in nature that may not 
be ultimately causal. Thus, the fact that the causal models of classical physics apply and are 
effective within the proper limits of classical physics does not mean that the ultimate character of 
the actual processes that are responsible for classical phenomena is causal. They may not be, for 
example, by virtue of their ultimately quantum nature. Nor, conversely, does the noncausal 
character of a model, for example, that of quantum mechanics in the spirit of Copenhagen, 
guarantee that quantum behavior is noncausal. It may ultimately prove to be causal.  
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7 Sometimes the term “causality” is used in accordance with the requirements of relativity, which 
further restricts causes to those occurring in the backward (past) light cone of the event that is 
seen as an effect of this cause, while no event can be a cause of any event outside the forward 
(future) light cone of that event. These restrictions follow from the assumption that causal 
influences cannot travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum, c. When speaking of the lack 
of causality, we only mean the inapplicability of the concept of causality found in classical 
physics and not about any incompatibility with relativity. 
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Noncausal models of the quantum constitution of nature are idealizations as well. Rigorously, 
it is only determinism that quantum phenomena preclude, because, as noted earlier, it is a well 
established experimental fact that identically prepared quantum experiments in general lead to 
different outcomes [2, v. 2, p. 73]. However, as against classical physics, the difference between 
these outcomes cannot be improved beyond certain limits (defined by the uncertainty relations), 
for example, by improving the precision of our instruments. This makes individual experiments 
unrepeatable as concerns their outcomes, as against the statistics of multiply repeated 
experiments, which are repeatable. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to pursue science 
without being able to repeat at least the statistical data our experiments provide. The absence of 
causality is an interpretative inference, automatic as it may be in the interpretations in the spirit 
of Copenhagen, each of which is, again, an idealization, albeit a nonrealist one.  
It should be kept in mind that there are also causal or realist (or both) interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, or alternative quantum theories, such as Bohmian mechanics, or theories 
defined by an assumption of a deeper underlying (pre-quantum) causal dynamics, which makes 
quantum mechanics an “emergent” surface-level theory. Khrennikov’s theory, discussed in 
Section 5, is a theory of this type, in which, however, not only quantum mechanics but also 
Bohr’s view of measurement and, especially, his concept of complementarity (explained below) 
apply to quantum phenomena.8   
One should also note that “the Copenhagen interpretation” is sometimes associated with the 
following view (e.g., [19]). The independent state of a quantum system is represented by the 
wave function that is associated with it. This wave function exhausts what could be known in 
advance about any possible state of the system. While the system is isolated from other systems 
(specifically measuring instruments), it evolves smoothly in time and its independent evolution is 
described, in realist and causal manner, by Schrödinger’s equation, but it is unobservable. The 
lack of determinism manifested in quantum phenomena is due to the disturbance introduced by 
observation. Bohr briefly entertained this type of idea in the so-called Como lecture of 1927, 
although he was ambivalent about it even then [2, v. 1, pp. 54-55; 5, pp. 191-201]. The idea 
appears to originate with Dirac, who introduced it sometime in 1926 while at Bohr’s Institute in 
Copenhagen and who appears to have influenced Bohr in this regard [20]. However, Bohr 
quickly came to realize the difficulties of sustaining it in quantum theory. Already his next 
publication on the subject abandons the idea, thus giving the Como argument barely a yearlong 
life span [2, v. 1, 92-101]. The view has, however, been and remains persistent in foundational 
arguments concerning quantum theory. This is not surprising. Apart from its general appeal on 
the account of realism and causality, it is found in Heisenberg’s The Principles of the Quantum 
Theory [1], Dirac’s The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory [21], and especially J. von 
Neumann’s Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics [22], all published around the 
same time (1930–1932). These were the most important early books on quantum mechanics, and 
they had and continue to have a strong impact. Although we will, in the discussion to follow, not 
be concerned with this form of the “Copenhagen” view and will restrict ourselves to Bohr’s 
interpretation after 1927, which does not conform to this view and is indeed in conflict with it, 
we thought it was important to register it here and to comment on its persistence.9  !
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8 Among others who have pursued this line of inquiry are A. M. Cetto and L. de la Pena, M. 
Kupczynski, and T. Nieuwenhuizen (see [18]). Bohr came to see quantum field theory as 
extending quantum mechanics along a nonrealist gradient.  
9 For an extensive analysis of this view and problems found in it, see [5, pp. 191-219]. 
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By “randomness” or “chance” we refer to a manifestation of the unpredictable. (Randomness 
and chance are not the same, but the difference between them is not germane for our argument.) 
It may or may not be possible to estimate whether a random event would occur, or even to 
anticipate it as an event. A random event may or may not result from some underlying causal 
dynamics unavailable to, or assumable by, us. Thus, in classical statistical physics, randomness 
and the resulting recourse to probability are due to insufficient information concerning systems 
that are at bottom causal but whose mechanical complexity prevents us from accessing their 
causal behavior and making deterministic predictions concerning this behavior. The situation is 
different in quantum physics, given the difficulties of sustaining arguments for the causality of 
the independent behavior of quantum objects or systems of quantum objects, even primitive 
(unsubdividable) individual quantum objects, such as those associated with elementary 
particles.10 If an interpretation is nonrealist, the absence of causality is, again, automatic, and the 
recourse to probability is irreducible in principle rather than only in practice. 
Probability and statistics deal with providing estimates of the occurrences of certain 
individual or collective events, in physics, or science in general, in accordance with 
mathematical probability theories. The terms “probabilistic” and “statistical” are generally used 
differently. “Probabilistic” refers to our estimates of the probabilities of either individual or 
collective events, such as of a coin toss or (assuming this claim is possible) of finding a quantum 
object in a given region of space. “Statistical” refers to our estimates concerning the outcomes of 
identical or similar experiments or to the average behavior of identical objects (or objects treated 
as identical).11 
A given definition of probability may already reflect this difference, as is the case in the 
Bayesian vs. the frequentist definition of probability. The Bayesian understanding of probability 
defines it as a degree of belief concerning the occurrence of possible individual events on the 
basis of the relevant information we possess and hence, generally, is subjective. The frequentist 
understanding, sometimes also referred to as frequentist statistics, defines probability 
statistically, in terms of sample data by the emphasis on the frequency or proportion of these 
data, which is often seen as more objective, although this can be debated. The Bayesian approach 
allows one to make estimates even concerning individual and especially unique events, say, 
betting on the outcome of a basketball game or, as in Pascal’s wager, on the existence of God 
and the salvation of the soul, rather than on frequently repeated events, such as repeated coin 
tosses. In the latter case, our estimations are defined by previous experience of the same or 
closely similar events; technically, no two coin tosses are ever quite the same, the point used by 
Bayesian theorists (there are differences between their views) against frequentist approaches to 
probability, which, again, reflects a more objectivist view [e.g., 24, pp. 317-320]. 
In quantum physics, where exact predictions appear to be, in general, impossible in principle 
even in dealing with individual objects and events, one considers identical quantum objects such 
as electrons or photons (not their identical preparation, which cannot be assured!), and the 
identically prepared measuring instruments as the initial condition of repeated experiments. The 
identical preparation of the instruments can be controlled (because their observable parts can be 
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10 The concept requires clarifications, which we put aside here. See [23], for a helpful discussion 
of this concept and the concept of quantum object in general from a realist perspective. 
11 The standard use of the term “quantum statistics” refers to the behavior of large multiplicities 
of identical quantum objects, such as electrons and photons, which behave differently, in 
accordance with, respectively, the Fermi-Dirac and the Bose-Einstein statistics.  
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described classically), while that of quantum objects themselves, again, cannot be. As a result, 
the outcomes of quantum experiments, even if identically prepared in terms of the states of the 
measuring instruments involved, will, in general, be different, which fact could, as will be 
discussed below, be interpreted on either frequentist or Bayesian lines. 
This brief summary sidesteps some of the deeper aspects of probability, but it suffices for our 
purposes. We shall comment on some of these aspects later, especially in Sections 4 and 5.12 We 
conclude here by noting that while randomness or chance introduces an element of chaos into 
order and reveals the character of world, or of our interactions with the world, probability 
introduces an element of order into situations defined by the role of randomness, and allows us to 
handle such situations better. Probability or statistics is about the interplay of randomness and 
order. This aspect of probability takes on a special, even unique, significance in quantum physics 
because of the presence of statistically ordered correlations (not found in classical physics) 
between certain data, such as those of the EPR-type experiments. These correlations are correctly 
predicted by the formalism of quantum mechanics and rules, such as Born’s rule or various 
forms of the projection postulates, which are added to the formalism, rather than are inherent in 
it. This does not mean that it is the only formalism that can predict these correlations. Bohmian 
mechanics, the predictions of which coincide with those of standard quantum mechanics, 
predicts them as well, but at the expense of nonlocality, which standard quantum mechanics 
appear to avoid, although the issue is under debate.  
Finally, by locality, we refer primarily to the compatibility with (special) relativity, which 
disallows physical connections or causal influences between events that propagate faster than the 
speed of light in a vacuum, c. Nonlocal theories, such as Bohmian mechanics (in all of its 
versions), allow for and even entail such connections. Bohmian mechanics allow for 
instantaneous connections of this type, even though it may not be possible to actually trace or 
enact these connections by human means.13 Nonlocality in this sense is usually, albeit not 
always, seen as undesirable. Standard quantum mechanics appear to avoid it, although the 
question of the locality (in the sense of compatibility with relativity) of quantum mechanics or 
quantum phenomena is a matter of great subtlety and much controversy, especially, as noted 
earlier, in the wake of the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems and related findings. There are 
alternative conceptions of nonlocality, sometimes linked to other terms and concepts, such as 
“separability” or “no signaling,” some of which apply in standard quantum mechanics as well, 
even if the latter is interpreted in the spirit of Copenhagen. In particular, quantum mechanics 
may be seen as nonlocal insofar as it allows, specifically in the EPR-type situations, for 
predictions at an, in principle, arbitrary distance on the basis of measurements performed at a 
given location. However, as Bohr argued in his reply to the EPR [4], it is possible to interpret 
quantum mechanics so as to preserve locality, and thus to avoid what Einstein famously called in 
this connection “spooky action at a distance.” In this view, while one could speak of spooky 
predictions at a distance, insofar as there is no physical explanation of the quantum-level reality 
responsible for these predictions, there is no spooky action at a distance [5, pp. 16, 271].  
 
3. The Bohr-Einstein Debate and the Nature of Quantum Reality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See, [25, 26] and references there. On the Bayesian philosophy of probability, in two different 
versions of it, see [24, 27].  
13 See Ref. [28] for an exposition of the last version of the theory developed by Bohm, in 
collaboration with B. Hiley. 
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Given the significance of the Bohr-Einstein debate for the subsequent discussions and debates 
concerning quantum foundations, we devote this section to outlining their respective positions 
and the essential issues at stake in their confrontation. While Einstein’s position remained 
essentially stable throughout his life, Bohr’s views underwent considerable revisions under the 
impact of his debate with Einstein and the development of quantum theory itself. Given our aims 
and scope, we shall only discuss the ultimate version of Bohr’s view, stabilized sometime in the 
1940s, by then especially shaped by his exchanges with Einstein concerning the EPR-type 
thought experiments (Einstein offered several versions of them).14  
In characterizing Einstein’s requirements for a proper, “complete,” physical theory W. Pauli 
notes the precedence of realism over causality in Einstein’s thinking [31, p. 13]. Intriguingly, 
Pauli does not comment on the significance of locality for Einstein, whose concept of realism 
was that of local realism. Einstein would prefer causality as well, in accordance with the 
ontological architecture of classical physics and relativity, in which his philosophical position 
was grounded. Pauli, however, is right to stress the precedence of realism over causality for 
Einstein. Pauli cites one of Einstein’s many statements on the subject: “There is such a thing as a 
real state of a physical system, which exists objectively, independently of any observation or 
measurement, and can in principle be described by the methods of expression of physics” [32, p. 
7; cited in 31, p. 131; emphasis added; also 3, pp. 138-39). The last part of Einstein’s statement 
is important. It reflects his understanding of the idealized nature of our physical theories, which 
distinguishes his realism from naïve realism. Einstein’s position is expressed more formally in 
the EPR paper in terms of a necessary criterion of completeness: for a theory to be considered 
complete (Einstein-complete)“every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in 
the physical theory” [3, p. 138]. With this criterion in hand, EPR then formulated their famous 
sufficient criterion of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with 
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists 
an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity” [3, p. 138]. Although not 
always expressly stated, both criteria are retained in Einstein’s subsequent arguments, where the 
focus of his analysis shifts from the completeness of quantum mechanics to its locality. The 
completeness, the Einstein-completeness, of quantum mechanics is still at stake in these 
arguments, just as locality was at stake in the EPR paper, because quantum mechanics is argued 
by Einstein to be either incomplete or, if complete, then nonlocal, the alternative considered in 
EPR’s article as well [3, p. 141]. While his overall view concerning the completeness (the 
Einstein-completeness) of a physical theory remained in place throughout, Einstein’s 
argumentation concerning the EPR-type experiments was qualified in his subsequent 
communications by statistical considerations to be discussed in the next section. 
A crucial point is that, in this view, a proper quantum theory should be able to assign to a 
quantum system, say, an electron, properties, “elements of reality,” that are independent of 
measurement and that would enable the theory to predict the electron’s behavior on the basis of 
this assignment, ideally, in exact rather than probabilistic terms. This would imply causality. By 
the same token, the uncertainty relations (seen by Einstein as an artifact of quantum mechanics, 
reflecting its incompleteness, rather than a law of nature, as they were by Bohr) would not apply 
at the ultimate level. Hence, just as in classical physics or relativity, the theory would be ideally 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For an extensive discussion of Bohr’s interpretation, especially his ultimate interpretation, see 
[29]. For an insightful and helpful analysis of Bohr’s earlier argumentation, see [30]. 
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descriptive first and would make its predictions, again, ideally exact, on the basis of the 
description, “expression,” it provides. Such a theory should, again, also be local, according to 
Einstein. The idea of “expression” in this sense is important for Einstein, because such an 
expression can only be achieved by means of conceptual construction, “the free choice of 
concepts,” rather than by means of observable facts themselves, which Einstein sees as the 
empiricist “philosophical prejudice,” found, for example, in E. Mach’s philosophy [33, p. 47]. 
Einstein was not a naïve realist, given the role he assigns to a free choice of (mathematical) 
concepts in creating our theories and approaching physical reality, although he appears to have 
had more confidence than other realists, such as Schrödinger, in the power of our concepts to 
capture this reality with more exactitude [13, pp. 152-53]. Indeed, from the time of his creation 
of general relativity on, Einstein was progressively putting more and more faith, in his own work 
and in general, in the mathematical conceptual architecture of fundamental physical theories as 
the way of approaching, in a realist way, the ultimate nature of reality. 
It is, Einstein argues, this kind of realist expression that quantum mechanics fails to deliver, 
which makes it incomplete, Einstein-incomplete, unless it is nonlocal. In other words, quantum 
mechanics fails in local realism. Einstein is factually correct, insofar as quantum mechanics, at 
least in Bohr’s and related interpretations in the spirit Copenhagen, does not provide a physical 
“expression,” a description, of individual quantum objects and processes, and it is the absence of 
this description that, as Bohr argued in his reply to EPR, allows one to maintain locality. In other 
words, while quantum mechanics may not be Einstein-complete, it is Bohr-complete. It is as 
complete as nature allows a theory of quantum phenomena to be, as things stand now, and, Bohr 
argues, it may also be interpreted as local [2, v. 2, p. 57; 4, pp. 701-702].  
Bohr’s interpretation is grounded in his argument concerning the irreducible role of 
measuring instruments in quantum physics, which eventually led him to his concept of 
phenomenon, defined by this role, introduced in the Warsaw Lecture of 1938 [34], under the 
impact of his exchanges with Einstein concerning the EPR experiment, and he based his ultimate 
interpretation in this concept. According to Bohr: 
I advocated the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the 
observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole 
experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem is free of any 
special intricacy since, in actual experiments, all observations are expressed by 
unambiguous statements referring, for instance, to the registration of the point at which 
an electron arrives at a photographic plate. Moreover, speaking in such a way is just 
suited to emphasize that the appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic quantum-
mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of determinate or statistical character, 
pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under conditions defined by classical 
physical concepts [describing the relevant observable parts of measuring instruments]. [2, 
v. 2, p. 64] 
Bohr’s appeal to classical concepts is often misunderstood. While the subject requires a separate 
discussion, its key points are worth stating here. First, although indispensable, classical concepts 
are never sufficient for a proper account of quantum phenomena. Secondly, the interaction 
between quantum objects and measuring instruments is quantum (otherwise no measurement 
could take place), hence, is not amenable to a description in terms of classical or any other 
concepts, anymore than any quantum process is. In other words, measuring instruments have 
both the classical strata, which we observe, and the quantum strata, through which they interact 
with quantum objects. This interaction is quantum but is, in Bohr’s terms, irreversibly amplified 
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to the classical level of observation, a conception related, although not quite identical, to that of 
decoherence [2, v. 2, p. 73]. The preparation of measuring instruments is classical and thus 
controllable, which enables us to repeat it, and this preparation itself need not involve h. The 
outcomes of measurements, under the impact of quantum objects, while observed by classical 
means, will involve h. By contrast, measurements dealing with classical objects, never involve h. 
Bohr sees quantum-mechanical formalism as “symbolic” because, while the theory uses 
mathematical symbols analogous to those used in classical mechanics, it does not, in his 
interpretation, refer these symbols to and, hence, does not describe the actual behavior of, 
quantum objects. Part of Bohr’s concept of phenomenon is that this concept, in principle, 
precludes any description of quantum objects and their behavior, which also implies the 
irreducible difference between quantum phenomena and quantum objects [4, p. 700].15 
Nevertheless, it is this behavior that is responsible for the emergence of these phenomena. 
A phenomenon in Bohr’s sense, then, would refer to what is observed in a single experiment, 
and only in a single experiment, a crucial point, on which we shall further comment presently. 
Physical quantities obtained in quantum measurements, such as those defining the physical 
behavior of certain (classically described) parts of measuring instruments, are effects of the 
interactions between quantum objects and measuring instrument, a form of efficacy without 
causality. But these properties are no longer assumed to correspond, even in principle, to any 
properties pertaining to quantum objects, even any single such property, rather than only certain 
joint properties, in accordance with the uncertainty relations. Accordingly, the quantum-
mechanical formalism only enables one to predict, in general probabilistically or statistically, 
what will be observed in measuring instruments under the impact of quantum objects. 
It is crucial that the concept of phenomenon is defined by “the observations [already] 
obtained under specified circumstances” and hence only to already registered phenomena, rather 
than to what could be predicted. For one thing, such predictions are, in general, probabilistic or 
statistical and, hence, what will happen can never be assured. (As Bohr noted in the passage in 
question, in some experiments, such those of the EPR type, such predictions could, for all 
practical purposes, be seen as determinate, but, as will be discussed below, still not completely.) 
By the same token, the concept of phenomenon entails a rigorous specification of each 
arrangement, determined by the type of measurement we want to make. This specification also 
reflects the irreducibly individual, indeed unique and unrepeatable, character of each 
phenomenon, sometimes also referred to by Bohr as “atomicity.” This concept is essentially 
equivalent to that of phenomena and should not be confused with the classical, Democritean, 
concept of atomicity, which refers to the indivisible ultimate constituents of matter itself. Bohr’s 
“atomicity” only refers to phenomena associated with single experiments. The constitutive role 
of these conditions can never be eliminated in considering quantum measurement or predictions, 
including in the EPR-type experiments, where these predictions concern objects that are 
physically unaffected by the measurements enabling them [4]. 
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15 Technically, as Kant realized, objects and phenomena are also different in classical physics. 
There, however, this difference could be disregarded. More complex classical systems, such as 
those considered in classical statistical physics, introduces further complexities, such situations 
are still fundamentally different from those of quantum physics. This is because the elemental 
individual constituents of such systems could be treated by descriptive causal models of classical 
mechanics, which is impossible in quantum theory, at least in Bohr’s and related interpretations.  
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Thus, if seen independently of the quantum mechanical context of its appearance, each mark 
on the screen in the double-slit experiment would be perceived as the same entity. Such a mark 
would appear the same regardless of the difference in the physical conditions and, hence, the 
outcome or rather the outcomes, “interference” or “no interference,” of the experiment, are 
defined collectively by the two complementary setups of the experiment. The first is that with 
both slits open and no counters, which would allow us to know through which slit each quantum 
object passed, and the second is that when such a knowledge is possible in one way or another 
(for example, by using counters), even in principle rather than only actually. According to Bohr’s 
understanding, however, each mark is part of a different individual phenomenon depending on 
these conditions, which are mutually exclusive in the case of complementary phenomena and are 
defined by each phenomenon uniquely in any circumstances. While, thus, a given single event 
does not allow one to establish in which setting it had occurred, the statistical distribution of the 
traces on the screen will always be different in these two setups. That the difference between two 
sets of outcomes is manifested only collectively over a large number of trials is important in 
interpreting the nature of probability assignments or, as in the statistical Copenhagen 
interpretation, the impossibility thereof in predicting the outcome of each individual experiment. 
That we always have a free choice as concerns what kind of experiment we want to perform 
is in accordance with the very idea of experiment, which, as Bohr notes, also defines classical 
physics or science in general [4, p. 699]. Contrary to the case of classical physics, however, 
implementing our decision concerning what we want to do will allow us to make only a certain 
type of prediction (for example, that concerning a future position measurement) and will 
unavoidably exclude the possibility of certain other, complementary, types of prediction (in this 
case, that concerning a future momentum measurement). It is in this way that we actively shape 
what will happen, define the course of reality, as just noted. 
Bohr’s concept of complementarity reflects this mutual exclusivity of certain situations of 
measurement or phenomena, but is not restricted to it. Complementarity is defined by: 
(a) a mutual exclusivity of certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet  
(b) the possibility of applying each one of them separately at any given point; and  
(c) the necessity of using all of them at different moments for a comprehensive account of the 
totality of phenomena that we must consider. 
Parts (b) and (c) of this definition are just as important as part (a), and to miss them, as is often 
done, is to miss much of the import of Bohr’s concept. Moreover, as just explained, in Bohr’s 
interpretation (at least in the ultimate version of it), one only deals with complementary 
phenomena manifest in measuring instruments and their classical properties under the impact of 
quantum objects. One never deals with complementary properties of quantum objects or their 
independent behavior, because, in Bohr’s view, no attribution of such properties, single or joint, 
to quantum objects is possible in the first place. Indeed, no complementary arrangements or 
phenomena can ever be associated with a single quantum object. One always needs two quantum 
objects in order to enact, in two separate experiments, two complementary arrangements, say, 
those associated, respectively, with the position or the momentum measurement, with the 
measured quantity itself physically pertaining strictly to the measuring instrument involved. The 
uncertainty relations, too, apply to the corresponding variables physically pertaining to 
measuring instruments and not to quantum objects. Furthermore, as correlative to 
complementarity, the uncertainty relations mean that one cannot even define, rather than only 
measure, both variables simultaneously. The recourse to probability, to which the uncertainty 
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relations are correlative, is the cost of our active role in defining physical events in quantum 
physics, rather than merely tracking them, as in classical physics.16 
Importantly, our freedom of choosing the experimental setup only allows us to select and 
control the initial setting up of a given experiment but not its outcome, which, again, can only be 
probabilistically estimated. This fact reflects the “objectivity” of the situation, defined by the 
verifiability and, thus, the possibility of the unambiguous communication of the data involved in 
our experiments (both that of their setups and their outcomes), and hence, the objective character 
of quantum mechanics in this interpretation. According to Bohr: 
A most conspicuous characteristic of atomic physics is the novel relationship between 
phenomena observed under experimental conditions demanding different elementary 
concepts for their description. Indeed, however contrasting such experiences might 
appear when attempting to picture a course of atomic processes on classical lines, they 
have to be considered as complementary in the sense that they represent equally essential 
knowledge about atomic systems and together exhaust this knowledge. The notion of 
complementarity does in no way involve a departure from our position as detached 
observers of nature, but must be regarded as the logical expression of our situation as 
regards objective description in this field of experience. The recognition that the 
interaction between the measuring tools and the physical systems under investigation 
constitutes an integral part of quantum phenomena has … forced us … to pay proper 
attention to the conditions of observation. [2, v. 2, p. 74; also p. 73; emphasis added]  
Thus the observers in quantum physics are as detached from measuring instruments as they 
are in classical physics from classical objects, thus ensuring the objectivity of Bohr’s 
scheme; the data in question or our predictions based on this data are the same for and hence 
independent of any particular observer. On the other hand, the measuring instruments used in 
quantum measurement can, in an act of observation or measurement, never be “detached” 
from quantum objects because the latter cannot be “extracted from” the closed observed 
phenomena (in Bohr’s sense) containing them [2, v. 2, p. 73]. Phenomena cannot be opened 
so as to reach quantum objects by disregarding the role of measuring instruments in the way 
it is possible in classical physics or relativity, and thus are in conflict with Einstein’s ideal of 
objectivity or completeness, which require a theory to describe the properties of the systems 
considered independently of measurement. 
Hence, although quantum objects do exist independently of us and of our measuring 
instruments, they cannot be observed or described independently. Nobody has ever seen, at 
least not thus far, a moving electron or photon as such, but only traces of this “movement” 
(assuming even this concept applied), traces that, in view of the uncertainty relations, do not 
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16 In part in view of the considerations given here, wave-particle complementarity, with which 
the concept of complementarity is associated most commonly, did not play a significant, if any, 
role in Bohr’s thinking. Indeed, Bohr does not appear to have ever spoken of this 
complementarity. His solution to the dilemma of whether quantum objects are particles or 
waves—or his “escape” from the paradoxical necessity of seeing them as both—is that they are 
neither. Instead, either feature is seen by Bohr as an effect or set of effects, particle-like (which 
may be individual or collective) or wave-like (which are always collective), of the interactions 
between quantum objects and measuring instruments, in which these effects are observed.  
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allow us to reconstitute this movement itself in the way it is possible in classical physics or 
relativity. In Bohr’s interpretation, quantum phenomena, again, preclude any description, if 
not, as in the present view, a conception, of quantum objects themselves and their behavior, 
which behavior is, nevertheless, responsible for the emergence of these phenomena. As he 
said: “in quantum mechanics [in this interpretation] we are not dealing with an arbitrary 
renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that 
such an analysis is in principle excluded” [2, v. 2, p. 62]. Bohr noted that, while, Einstein’s 
attitude “may seem well balanced in itself,” it “implies a rejection,” on philosophical 
grounds, of Bohr’s argumentation leading to this conclusion [2, v. 2, p. 62]. 
It is sometimes argued that Bohr’s interpretation implies that quantum mechanics or even 
physics in general should not be concerned with the ultimate character of nature, or reality, but 
only with what can be known about nature. Bohr did says on one occasion that in “our 
description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to 
track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience” [2, 
v. 1, 18]. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that this statement, actually uncommon, if not 
unique, in Bohr, reflects Bohr’s 1929 and pre-EPR view, rather than his ultimate view. However, 
even if one accepts this type of view, it is, one might argue, not so much that Bohr wants to 
arbitrarily, merely as a matter of his philosophical position, renounce “disclosing the real essence 
of the phenomena,” which could, after all, be part of our experience. Instead, one might argue 
that Bohr came to think, especially following his exchange with EPR, that, insofar as quantum 
mechanics and higher-level quantum theories are correct, they suggest that a quantum-level 
descriptive idealized model of quantum-level reality, may be “in principle excluded,” [2, v. 2, p. 
62]. This, again, need not mean that such a model is bound to remain excluded (hence, our 
emphasis on “may be”). As far as it is excluded, however, Bohr’s position reflects a much 
stronger view than that urging one merely to renounce “disclosing the real essence of the 
phenomena,” because, if such is the case, even if one wanted to have such a model, one might 
not be able to develop it. His full sentence makes this view even more pronounced: “in quantum 
mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis 
[reaching quantum objects and their behavior] of atomic phenomena but with a recognition that 
such an analysis is in principle excluded” [2, v. 2, p. 62]. By the same token, it is no longer 
possible “to disclose the real essence of the [quantum] phenomena,” although it is possible “to 
track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience,” 
and such a tracking would not be possible otherwise. In sum, Bohr was concerned with reality as 
much as Einstein was. The difference is that, unlike Einstein, Bohr came to accept the possibility 
of reality without realism. 
 
4. Quantum Probability and the Statistical Copenhagen Interpretation 
 
Bohr’s epistemology, just outlined, entails a type of understanding of quantum randomness and 
quantum correlations, and of probability or statistics in quantum physics that is different from 
that found in classical physics, including classical statistical physics. This general understanding, 
however, allows for different interpretations, two of which will be considered in this section: 
Bohr’s interpretation in its ultimate version, introduced in the preceding section, the statistical 
Copenhagen interpretation. We shall also, briefly and by way of comparison, comment on the 
Baysian view of quantum probability, which could in turn allow for different interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, possibly related to different philosophies of probability, noted above.   
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The general understanding in question in this section is defined by the absence of realism 
and, as a consequence, the applicability of the idea of causality to individual quantum processes, 
as discussed in the preceding section in the context of Bohr’s interpretation. This understanding, 
thus, fundamentally departs from the way we understand classical physical systems and 
processes in considering which the recourse to probability or statistics becomes necessary, as in 
classical statistical physics or chaos and complexity theories. In these cases the behavior of the 
physical systems considered is assumed to be causal. However, the mechanical complexity of 
these systems makes the recourse to probability or statistics unavoidable in predicting their 
behavior. A coin toss is, arguably, the most common example of this situation, unless the 
quantum aspects of the constitution of the coin are considered a factor (which is, generally, not 
the case). 
By contrast, in dealing (in accordance with the understanding in question) with quantum 
objects and processes, we confront the absence of causality even in the case of primitive 
(indecomposable) individual objects (“elementary particles”) and processes, which makes the 
probabilistic character of our predictions concerning the corresponding quantum phenomena 
unavoidable. The reference to the corresponding quantum phenomena and our emphasis reflect 
the fact that, in this view or the interpretations of quantum objects and processes it implies, our 
predictions only concern the effects of quantum processes manifested in the measuring 
instruments involved. This is an interpretation of the situation (hence our emphasis), which, as 
stated from the outset, is, as the situation, strictly in accord with what is observed, because, in 
Bohr’s words, “one and the same experimental arrangement may yield different recordings [of 
their outcomes]” [2, v. 2, p. 73]. As explained above, it is possible to speak of “one and the same 
experimental arrangement,” because, unlike the outcomes of experiments, we can control the 
measuring instruments involved, given that the observable parts of these instruments relevant for 
setting up our experiments can be described and (with qualifications offered earlier) behave 
classically. On the other hand, the state of each quantum object under investigation in each 
repeated experiment (say, at the time when an electron or photon is emitted from the source 
considered) will not, in general, be identical. Under these conditions, the probabilistic character 
of such predictions will, again, concern even elemental individual quantum events. For, in 
contrast to classical physics, in the case of quantum phenomena it does not appear possible (and 
in Bohr’s and related interpretations is rigorously impossible) to subdivide these phenomena into 
entities of different kinds concerning which our predictions could be exact, even ideally or in 
principle. Any attempt to do so will require the use of an experimental setup that leads to a 
phenomenon or set of phenomena of the epistemologically same type (they could be different 
physically), concerning which we could again only make probabilistic predictions, or possibly 
only statistical predictions that concern multiplicities of identically prepared experiments.17  
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17 Given the data obtained in quantum experiments, this would have to be the case even if one 
assumes the underlying causality of quantum processes. This fact is reflected in Bohmian 
theories, in which a given quantum object is assumed to possess both position and the 
momentum, as defined exactly, at any moment of time, thus allowing one for realism and 
causality. However, these theories retain the uncertainty relations and, correlatively, reproduce 
the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, because a given measurement always disturbs, 
actually disturbs, the object and displaces the value of one of these properties. By contrast, this 
type of concept of disturbing quantum objects and processes by observation (a concept that 
allows one to give a classical-like independent architecture to quantum objects and processes 
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Bohr presents his view of quantum probability in terms of the concepts of phenomenon and 
atomicity (which are, as noted, more or less equivalent) in the Warsaw lecture of 1938, “The 
Causality Problem in Atomic Physics,” which introduces both concepts. He says: 
The unrestricted applicability of the causal mode of description to physical phenomena has 
hardly been seriously questioned until Planck’s discovery of the quantum of action, which 
disclosed a novel feature of atomicity in the laws of nature supplementing in such 
unsuspected manner the old doctrine of the limited divisibility of matter. Before this 
discovery statistical methods were of course extensively used in atomic theory but merely as 
a practical means of dealing with the complicated mechanical problems met with in the 
attempt at tracing the ordinary properties of matter back to the behaviour of assemblies of 
immense numbers of atoms. It is true that the very formulation of the laws of 
thermodynamics involves an essential renunciation of the complete mechanical description of 
such assemblies and thereby exhibits a certain formal resemblance with typical problems of 
quantum theory. So far there was, however, no question of any limitation in the possibility of 
carrying out in principle such a complete description; on the contrary, the ordinary ideas of 
mechanics and thermodynamics were found to have a large field of application also proper to 
atomic phenomena, and above all to offer an entirely sufficient basis for the experiments 
leading to the isolation of the electron and the measurement of its charge and mass. Due to 
the essentially statistical character of the thermodynamical problems which led to the 
discovery of the quantum of action, it was also not to begin with realized, that the 
insufficiency of the laws of classical mechanics and electrodynamics in dealing with atomic 
problems, disclosed by this discovery, implies a shortcoming of the causality ideal itself. [34, 
pp. 94–95] 
As Bohr says elsewhere: “[I]t is most important to realize that the recourse to probability laws 
under such circumstances is essentially different in aim from the familiar application of 
statistical considerations as practical means of accounting for the properties of mechanical 
systems of great structural complexity. In fact, in quantum physics we are presented not with 
intricacies of this kind, but with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise the 
peculiar feature of indivisibility, or ‘individuality,’ characterizing the elementary processes” [2, 
p. 34]. This inability is primarily due to the inaccessible or even (although Bohr, again, may not 
have claimed as much) inconceivable nature quantum processes. The lack of causality, which is, 
again, an automatic consequence, limits us to probabilistic or possibly only statistical estimates 
of the outcomes of all quantum experiments. Thus, in each case, the wave function provides, in 
Schrödinger’s way of putting it (by this point, in 1935, disparagingly), probabilistic or statistical 
“expectation catalogues” concerning quantum experiments [13, p. 158]. Any such catalogue is 
reset with each new measurement, which renders previous history of measurement on the same 
object irrelevant as concerns our predictions from this point on [5, pp. 73-76]. The meaning of 
these catalogues may be subjected to a further interpretation, even if one follows the spirit of 
Copenhagen. It may be added that, if one thinks along these lines, the wave function does not 
have any special significance vis-à-vis other ways of providing quantum predictions. In quantum 
field theory, one no longer relies on wave functions (which are Hilbert space vectors) and uses 
only Hilbert-space operators. At the same time, however, the fact that probabilistic predictions of 
quantum mechanics are correct is enigmatic, insofar as it does not appear to have, and in Bohr’s 
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when they are not disturbed by observation) is inapplicable in Bohr’s interpretation or the 
statistical Copenhagen interpretation [2, v. 2, pp. 63-64]. 
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view does not have, an underlying physical justification of the type found in classical physics 
when the latter must use probability and statistics. We appear to be lucky to be able to make 
these predictions. According to Pauli, who follows Bohr and even uses Bohr’s locutions 
(“rational generalization” and “the finiteness of the quantum of action”), although Pauli’s overall 
interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics is somewhat different: !
As this indeterminacy [that reflected in the uncertainty relations] is an unavoidable element 
of every initial state of a system [a quantum object] that is at all possible according to the 
new [quantum-mechanical] law, the development of the system even can never be 
determined as was the case in classical mechanics. The theory predicts only the statistics of 
the results of an experiment, when it is repeated under a give condition. Like the ultimate fact 
without any cause, the individual outcome of a measurement is, however, in general not 
comprehended by laws. This must in general be the case, if quantum or wave mechanics is 
interpreted as a rational generalization of classical physics [mechanics], which take into 
account the finiteness of the quantum of action [Planck’s constant, h]. The probabilities 
occurring in the new laws have then to be considered to be primary, which means not 
deducible from deterministic [causal] laws. As an example of these primary probabilities I 
mention here the fact that the time at which an individual atom will undergo a certain 
reaction stays undetermined even under conditions where the rate of occurrence of this 
reaction for a large collection of atoms is practically certain. [31, p. 32]18  
Pauli speaks of determinism rather than causality, but this does not affect the situation in 
question because his concept of determinism is in effect the same as the present concept of 
causality and, besides, as explained in Section 2, in the case of classical mechanics both notions 
coincide. Most important here is Pauli’s main claim: “The theory predicts only the statistics of 
the results of an experiment, when it is repeated under a give condition. Like the ultimate fact 
without any cause, the individual outcome of a measurement is, however, in general not 
comprehended by laws.” Given that Pauli does not specify otherwise, this appears to include 
probabilistic or, in this view, only statistical laws of quantum mechanics, which, by definition, 
only apply to statistical multiplicities of repeated quantum events. Indeed, he corroborates this 
reading elsewhere in the context of complementarity: “In the general case of the quantum-
mechanical state of a material particle, neither the position nor the momentum is predictable with 
certainty; in consequence the state can be described only by statistical statements about the 
distribution of values of the results of possible measurements of position or momentum of this 
state. Formally these statements are embraced symbolically in a wave function, consisting of a 
real and an imaginary part” (31, p. 99; Pauli’s emphasis). 
This point has an important implication, which is not stated by Pauli in this form but which 
leads to the statistical Copenhagen interpretation. For it follows that, in this view, the primitive 
individual quantum processes and events are not only beyond description, that of or derived from 
quantum-mechanical formalism included, or possibly even conception, but are also beyond 
predictions, even probabilistic predictions (exact predictions, even ideal ones, are, again, 
excluded automatically in the absence of such a description). In other words, the outcome of an 
individual quantum experiment, a future individual quantum event, cannot, in general, be 
assigned probability: it is completely random. Only the statistics of multiply repeated (identically 
prepared) experiments can be predicted, which gives the corresponding meaning to the 
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18 Among other major figures who adopted this position were J. Schwinger [35, pp. 14-15] and, 
earlier, again, with a negative attitude, Schrödinger [13, p. 154]. 
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expectation catalogues provided by the formalism, say, by the wave function. We shall explain 
the emphasis on “in general” presently, merely noting for the moment that in some experiments, 
it is possible to assign a probability to individual quantum events for all practical purposes, but 
not in full rigor. It might appear or be argued that one could speak more rigorously (rather than 
only loosely) of the probability of a (future) individual quantum event, similarly to the way one 
does in the case of a coin toss. It might also appear that, just as in the case of a coin toss, one 
could, by using the quantum-mechanical formalism, say, the wave function, assign probabilities 
for individual events, defined, along Bayesian lines, in terms of “a degree of belief,” rather than 
in terms of frequencies or statistics. Both types of claims would appear to be implied by the 
standard Bayesian views of probability, found, for example, in [24] and [27]. (Such views may 
deviate from each other in other respects.) It is not our aim to unconditionally deny these claims 
or argue against Bayesian approaches to quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, which 
need not be limited by these claims alone.19 We argue instead that these particular claims pose 
difficulties given the data observed in quantum experiments thus far, and that in any event the 
statistical view of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics (advocated by both 
interpretations proposed here, different as they are in other respects, specifically as concerns 
realism) is consistent with the character of these data. 
The statistical Copenhagen interpretation may be seen (a matter of perspective, however) as 
more radical epistemologically than the Bayesian view, even if a nonrealist one, as defined by 
the claims just stated, insofar as in this interpretation not even the probabilistic “knowledge” 
concerning, or even the application of the concept of probability to, individual quantum events is 
possible. First of all, at least in most quantum situations, any verification of such individual 
estimates would still involve multiple events, and these individual estimates will rely on that 
data, reflecting these repeatable statistics. A Bayesian might contest this point in the case of 
quantum phenomena similarly to the way it might be and has been contested by Bayesians in the 
case of our estimates of the probability of a coin toss [24, pp. 317-20]. More crucial is that an 
individual quantum event may be, and in the statistical Copenhagen interpretation is, beyond 
assigning it a probability at all. Consider the double-slit experiment. It is true that in the case of 
the interference setup (both slits open and there are no counters allowing us to detect through 
which slit each particle in question passes), we observe the interference pattern (in the absence of 
actual waves, “correlational pattern” might be a better term), which is defined by the zones of 
permitted or “forbidden” impact. This pattern is strictly statistical in nature, manifesting itself 
only in a very large number of trials, around 70,000. The statistical nature of this pattern also 
reflects the fact that rigorously there is no zone of “forbidden” impact for any individual trial. 
Any given trial can leave its mark anywhere on the screen, as is clearly shown by the famous 
data of A. Tonomura’s single electron build-up experiments [38]. Some trials (admittedly a 
statistically small number) can produce no impact at all. 
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19 The so-called quantum Bayesianism or QBism exemplifies the complexities of Bayesian 
thinking in quantum theory and beyond [36, 37]. While it adopts a nonrealist view of quantum 
objects and processes, and in this respect is in accord with Bohr’s interpretation and the 
statistical Copenhagen interpretation, it is different from both in other respects [37]. QBism is 
Bayesian and nonrealist, but not all Bayesian or all nonrealist positions are QBist. To properly 
address QBism, including in its Bayesian aspects, and to fairly assess its claims would require an 
extensive analysis that cannot be undertaken here.  
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In view of these considerations, it appears difficult to speak rigorously of assigning a 
probability to an individual trial. It is true that given the setups in certain experiments, such as 
the Stern-Gerlach experiment or some interferometry experiments it may be possible to speak, 
nearly with certainty, of an object having a 50 percent probability of taking one path or another 
in the corresponding arrangement. First, however, if so, this is true only in some experiments, 
which is why we use “in general” in speaking of the impossibility of such assignments. 
Secondly, even in these cases, there will be some trials, however small in number, in which no 
outcome will be registered, and unlike in classical cases, where similar statistical deviations may 
occur, it is not a matter of outside interferences, but something inherent in quantum experiments.  
It would, then, also appear (without, again, offering a definitive claim) that these 
circumstances complicate, even if not exclude, the application, in quantum physics, of a 
Bayesian view, insofar as it refers estimates, bets on, the outcomes of individual events on the 
basis of the information one has.20 A given quantum phenomenon or event would, in Bohr’s 
definition, be seen in relation to the conditions defining this multiplicity, such as one or the other 
setups of the double-slit experiment, that gives rise to the interference patter or that in which this 
pattern will not appear. According to Pauli: “The mathematical inclusion, in quantum mechanics, 
of the possibilities of natural events has turned out to be a sufficiently wide framework to 
embrace the irrational actuality [i.e., beyond even the laws of quantum theory] of the single 
event as well” [31, p. 47]. In any event, a corresponding interpretation, such the statistical 
Copenhagen interpretation, appears to be consistent with the experimental data in question in 
quantum mechanics. 
Finally, to exercise an even greater caution, it is also true that one could, even in quantum 
experiments (we, again, only addressing quantum physics here), assign probabilities on other 
bases than those of quantum mechanics, for example, by using other physical laws or even 
without any physical laws. We are also not saying that the Bayesian approach does not work in 
general in physics and beyond: there are many situations where it does, for example, when we 
need estimate the probabilities of certain human events, as in betting on the outcome of a 
basketball game. Even in quantum experiments, then, one could make any predictions one likes 
or must in view of one’s Bayesian prior. However, the question is that of the effectiveness of our 
predictions in physics, of who will do, bet, better in physics, in predicting the outcomes of 
physical experiments. Consider, again, the double-slit experiment. One will “win” with quantum 
mechanics in hand against those who do not know it or whose theory is not as good, but one 
would win or will not consistently lose, only in many trials, which fact implicitly contains 
statistics. This is far from insignificant, and is a powerful reason to use quantum mechanics for 
predicting the outcomes of quantum experiments. Our point is only that quantum mechanics, 
generally, offers one no help as concerns predicting and hence betting on the outcome of a single 
experiment, because one cannot rigorously predict what happens, although, as noted earlier, this 
is in practice workable in some experiments—in practice, but not in full rigor. Accordingly, still 
speaking with more caution than definitiveness and by way of an interpretive choice, the 
statistical approach to quantum mechanics may be more rigorous than a Bayesian one. Pauli 
appears to have thought so as well. In fact, none of “the usual Copenhagen suspects” appears to 
have been Bayesian.  
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20 Of course, in the Bayesian scheme of things, there may be some individual events to which 
one cannot assign probabilities, but, in general, one can and usually does.   
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Bohr’s position concerning this alternative between assigning probabilities to individual 
quantum events on Bayesian lines and the strictly statistical nature of all quantum predictions 
(the statistical Copenhagen interpretation) does not appear to have been expressly stated in his 
works. Hence it could, in principle, be interpreted either way, and it was interpreted on more 
Bayesian lines previously by one of the present authors [5]. However, there does not appear to be 
an expressed statement to that effect in Bohr either. Indeed, Bohr, who is, again, careful in 
selecting his terms, clearly and even strictly prefers “statistical” to “probabilistic” in referring to 
quantum predictions throughout his oeuvre, which makes one inclined to see his view along the 
statistical, rather than Bayesian, lines, as against [5], thus revising the position taken there. 
Consider his comment, already cited above but especially relevant here, on Einstein’s 1936 
criticism of quantum mechanics: 
Einstein … argued that the quantum-mechanical description is to be considered merely as a 
means of accounting for the average behavior of a large number of atomic systems, and his 
attitude to the belief that it should offer an exhaustive description of the individual 
phenomena is expressed in the following words: “To believe this is logically possible without 
contradiction, but is so very contrary to my scientific instinct that I cannot forego the search 
for a more complete conception [that of the description of individual quantum processes, as 
an ideally exact description].” … Even if such an attitude might seem well balanced in itself, 
it nevertheless implies a rejection of the whole argument exposed in the preceding 
[essentially an argument explaining Bohr’s interpretation], aiming to show that, in quantum 
mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis 
[reaching quantum objects and their behavior] of atomic phenomena but with a recognition 
that such an analysis is in principle excluded. [2, v. 2, pp. 61-62; 39, p. 349] 
It might appear that Bohr implies here that quantum mechanics does, contrary to Einstein’s 
assessment, provide an exhaustive “description” of the individual quantum phenomena, rather 
than as a means of accounting for the average behavior of a large number of atomic systems. 
More accurately, given his interpretation as considered here, Bohr might appear to suggest that 
quantum mechanics provides an exhaustive predictive account of individual quantum 
phenomena. However, he does not say that these predictions, which, it follows, would be 
unavoidably probabilistic, concern individual phenomena, rather than the statistics obtained in 
repeated identically prepared experiments, as, say, in the double-slit experiment. It is true that, as 
explained above, Bohr defines each phenomenon as individual. But he also defined a 
phenomenon only as an observed, registered phenomenon, and not as anything predicted. This 
allows one to interpret all quantum-mechanical predictions as, in general, statistical, rather than 
as probabilistic predictions pertaining to individual quantum experiments, consistently with this 
definition, “in general,” because in some cases individual predictions are possible for all 
practical purposes, but never completely.21 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In certain situations, such as those of the EPR type, we can, for all practical purposes, predict 
certain quantities exactly, but this is never true in full rigor either, for the reasons just considered. 
There is always a non-zero probability that the object in question will not be found where it is 
expected to be found at the moment of time for which the prediction is made. Unlike the Bell-
Bohm version of the EPR experiment for spin (at stake in Bell’s and related theorems), the actual 
experiment proposed by EPR, dealing with continuous variables, cannot be physically realized, 
because the EPR-entangled quantum state is non-normalizable. This fact does not affect the 
fundamentals of the case, which can be considered in terms of the idealized experiment proposed 
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Accordingly, what Bohr says here is at the very least compatible with the statistical 
Copenhagen interpretation. His elaboration, then, could be read as follows. It is true that, at least 
in Bohr’s or other interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen, quantum mechanics does not 
provide a description of individual quantum processes (or quantum objects), and, if this is the 
criterion for the completeness of quantum theory, it is incomplete. The question, as noted from 
the outset, is whether nature or our interactions with nature allow us to do better. Bohr assumes 
that it might not, at least as things stand now, which is, again, not the same as to say that it never 
will. This is the meaning of his statement that “in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with 
an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis [reaching quantum objects and their 
behavior] of atomic phenomena but with a recognition that such an analysis is in principle 
excluded.” This is not inconsistent with the fact that quantum mechanics is “a means of 
accounting for the average behavior of a large number of atomic systems” in repeated 
experiments, a means of predictive accounts, providing the statistics of these repeated 
experiments. In other words, it is not only that individual (or for that matter any other) quantum 
objects and processes are beyond description or even conception, but, which is the main point at 
the moment, also that individual quantum experiments are beyond prediction as well, allowing 
only for the statistics of repeated experiments. Any analysis beyond that of phenomena in Bohr’s 
sense (which are individual) and the statistics of repeated experiments (which are always 
multiple) is “in principle excluded,” again, at least as things stand now. 
This may be unacceptable to Einstein, but may, again, be as much as it is possible for us to 
have, which makes quantum mechanics complete, as complete as possible, at least as things 
stand now. Einstein might not have had in mind all the nuances just spelled out, but this is 
secondary, vis-à-vis the interpretation itself thus suggested. Einstein did note, however, that if 
quantum mechanics is the statistical theory of ensembles, then the paradox of nonlocality arising 
from his analysis of the EPR-type experiment would disappear, and quantum mechanics could be 
seen as local. As he said on several occasions, if one regards the wave function as relating to 
“many systems, to ‘an ensemble of systems,’ in the sense of statistical mechanics,” then “the 
paradox” arising in view of EPR’s argument is eliminated [39, p. 375; 32, p. 8; 40, pp. 205, 211]. 
Einstein’s statistical alternative, however, still leaves quantum mechanics incomplete by his 
criteria, Einstein-incomplete, because of its inability to provide a properly exhaustive physical 
description of the behavior of individual quantum systems of the kind classical mechanics does, 
including for the individual constituents of the systems considered in classical statistical physics. 
Accordingly, this alternative would still be insufficient for him to accept quantum mechanics as 
the way of describing nature in its ultimate constitution. As he says, “[O]ne can safely accept the 
fact . . . that the description of the single system is incomplete, if one assumes that there is no 
corresponding complete law for the complete description of the single system which [law] 
determines its development in time” [40, p. 205]. In this case, “The statistical character of the ... 
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by EPR. There are experiments (e.g., those involving photon pairs produced in parametric down 
conversion) that statistically approximate the idealized entangled state constructed by EPR for 
continuous variables. These experiments are consistent with the present argument. They also 
reflect the fact that the EPR thought experiment is a manifestation of correlated events for 
identically prepared experiments with EPR pairs, which can in this regard be understood on the 
model of the Bell-Bohm version of the EPR experiment. In any event, there are quantum 
experiments, such as, paradigmatically, the double-slit experiment, in which the assignment of 
probabilities to the outcomes of individual events is difficult and even impossible to assume. 
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theory would ... follow necessarily from the incompleteness of the description of the [individual] 
systems in quantum mechanics” [33, p. 81]. In other words, in this view, quantum mechanics 
provides no account of individual quantum systems at all, which, again, corresponds to Bohr’s 
view or that of the statistical Copenhagen interpretation. In this view, however, such a theory is 
complete insofar as it does all that nature or, again, our interactions with nature allows us to do. 
So both completeness (admittedly only the Bohr completeness, which leaves quantum mechanics 
Einstein-incomplete) and locality would be preserved, in either Bohr’s interpretation, whether 
one interprets it on Bayesian or statistical lines, or in the statistical Copenhagen interpretation.  
 
 
 
5. The PCSFT Model: Quantum Probabilities from Classical Random Fields 
Interacting with Threshold Detectors 
 
We now present the statistical model, “the pre-quantum classical statistical field theory 
(PCSFT),” explained in detail in [41-43], to which we refer the reader for details. Here we only 
outline the key conceptual features of the model. In this model, quantum systems are considered 
as “symbolic” representations of classical random fields fluctuating at time and space scales that 
are essentially finer than quantum laboratory scales. In relation to this underlying level, this 
model is realist, analogously to classical statistical physics (which, however, deals with particle-
like objects). We also keep in mind the complexities of realist models indicated earlier, which 
are present in this model as well but which we put aside. The key feature of the model as far as 
its potential relation to the experiment is concerned is that, by interacting with detectors of the 
threshold type, the classical fields considered by the model produce clicks in these detectors [42, 
43, 45]. These clicks are interpreted as quantum events. They are context-dependent, just as such 
clicks are in standard quantum mechanics, in whatever interpretation, and, to begin with, in the 
observed quantum phenomena [41, 42]. 
They also correspond to the probabilistic or statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, and 
hence could, in PCSFT, be interpreted on lines of the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, as 
discussed earlier. We note, however, that the dependence of predictions of PCSFT on the 
threshold detection process involves numerous experimental parameters, such as the detection 
threshold, size of coincidence window, pulse duration, and so on [39, 40, 42]. These parameters 
are typically treated as technical experimental features, “experimental technicalities,” and are 
ignored in other fundamental pre-quantum models. The presence of such technicalities as 
constitutive (rather than auxiliary, technical) elements is a strong feature of PCSFT, because it 
allows for the falsification of the model. By the same token, although the model’s probabilistic 
predictions for frequencies of clicks of threshold type detectors coincide with those of quantum 
theory, the special type of dependence on the parameters just mentioned makes it possible to 
distinguish PCSFT from quantum mechanics at the level of such dependencies. Moreover, in 
many cases, limiting our understanding to the standard quantum formalism cannot provide 
definite recommendations concerning such technicalities. For example, it appears that in the 
Bell-type experiments the size of the coincidence window is not derived from quantum theory; 
experimenters select this size “by hand” to match better with quantum theory [46]. PCSFT 
typically predicts the range of technical parameters, for example, the coincidence windows, and 
hence can in principle be falsified on experimental grounds, without referring to quantum-
mechanical formalism. 
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PCSFT carries with it a rather special interpretation of the wave function or, more generally, 
of the density operator as the covariance operator of the prequantum random field. This 
interpretation differs crucially from Schrödinger’s initial conception of the wave function as 
explicitly representing a physical field or interpretations of quantum mechanics that maintain this 
conception.22 On the other hand, it is in accord with Einstein’s interpretation of the wave 
function as representing statistical features of an ensemble of identically prepared quantum 
systems, with treating them as symbolic representations of classical random fields. However, the 
interpretation of the quantum state as the covariance operator of the corresponding prequantum 
random field gives a specific physical content to Einstein’s statistical interpretation,  
because it explicitly specify the way in which statistical features of the ensemble of identically 
prepared systems is encrypted in the quantum state. By the same token, it is also different from 
the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, which is equally statistical in that it refers to an 
ensemble of the identically prepared experiments (in terms of the measuring instruments 
involved), but in which the wave function or the density operator is a merely symbolic predictive 
tool devoid of any physical content. It should also be noted that, for composite quantum systems, 
the covariance operator of the corresponding random field contains an additional component 
corresponding to the random background field, i.e., this operator is not reduced to the quantum 
state. The role of the background random field is discussed in more detail below.  
In PCSFT, the irradiance of a beam of light is only an indication of its average state. If we 
could magnify local states, we should see a little bit of chaos. At some points the amplitude of 
the waves is well below the average, and at other points we get arbitrarily high spikes. In other 
words, the field is “clumpy” at the microscopic level. Now, let us suppose that we have a point-
like detector. When the field crosses the plane of detection, it might happen that the local 
amplitude is close to average or lower. No detection is possible. It can also happen that we have 
an amplitude spike followed by several small crests. Again, the signal does not accumulate above 
the threshold, and nothing happens. Yet, there is a real probability that an amplitude spike will 
continue over several cycles. In this case, sustained resonance above the threshold will result in a 
detection click. Consequently, the pattern of detection is produced by the low probability of 
transient “spikes” in a continuous field. Now, it is not true that we deal with single discrete 
entities at the moment and point of detection. The probability of a coincidence click, i.e., 
matching of two trains of spikes (at the micro-scale) at two detectors is nonzero, even 
theoretically. It decreases with increase of the threshold, but even for very high thresholds a 
random field can produce matching spikes. Thus, although, if one installs two detectors, one by 
each slit, the probability of double clicks can be made very small, they are ultimately irreducible 
[42]. This is one of the reasons why it is impossible to use the functional (as opposed to operator) 
representation of quantum observables. However, the main reason for the situation is quantum 
contextuality, corresponding to and indeed defining Bohr’s concept of complementarity and his 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, as discussed earlier. A classical signal has no sharp 
position in space, that is, what is known as the “value definitiveness postulate” (all observables 
defined for a quantum-mechanical system have definite values at all times) is not valid for 
classical signals. “Signal’s position” only has meaning in the context of the position 
measurement [43].  
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22 Schrödinger retreated from the idea in the late 1920s in the wake of Born’s probabilistic 
interpretation of it as a “probability catalogue,” as Schrödinger himself called it, as explained 
earlier [13, p. 158]. However, he gradually returned to it following EPR’s paper [3]. 
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However, at least in this model, one cannot, in general, represent quantum compound 
systems in entangled states by considering random fields propagating in a vacuum, and, hence, 
say, to violate Bell’s inequality in the way quantum mechanics or it appears (the case is as yet 
not entirely established experimentally or is at least under debate) the relevant observed data 
does. One has to consider a random background field that is present everywhere. We may note, 
by way of analogy (keeping in mind the differences between the present model and 
Schrödinger’s conception), that this is not unlike the way in which Schrödinger thought, on his 
way to the discovery of his version of quantum mechanics as wave mechanics, of “the wave 
radiation that forms the basis of the universe.” In Schrödinger’s way of thinking, the concept of 
an elementary particle, mathematically considered by then, as it is now, a dimensional point-like 
entity, would be replaced with that of a particular effect of these wave-like vibrations. As he 
said: “This means nothing more than taking seriously the undulatory theory of the moving 
corpuscle proposed by de Broglie and Einstein, according to which the latter [i.e. the corpuscle] 
is nothing more than a kind of ‘white crest’ on the wave radiation forming the basis of the 
universe” [48, p. 95]. This became the program he pursued in his approach to quantum 
phenomena. At bottom, everything would be continuous, field-like. Accordingly, his mechanics 
was an undulatory, wave, rather than quantum, mechanics. It was analogous to classical wave 
physics, but, as he stressed, not identical to the latter, in part, given the difference between his 
mathematical formalism and that of classical (wave) physics. 
In the present model, by contrast, the deeper underlying field (absent in Schrödinger’s 
approach) is classical. This might be either in accord with or in contrast to other approaches of, 
conceptually, the same kind, such as those of quantum-gravity proposals, depending on whether 
the underlying fields considered in such a proposal are classical, or classical-like, or not, for 
example, if it is more quantum-like. The status of string or brane theory in this regard is an 
intriguing question, which we shall, however, put aside here, although the scale of these theories 
is a relevant issue. We also leave aside the question of quantum field theory and high-energy 
fundamental physics from this perspective, which would require an extensive separate treatment. 
One might add that PCSFT, as a theory of continuous classical fields, and hence the overall 
model under discussion is manifestly different from Bohmian theories, for one thing, because at 
the quantum limits they imply different theories, the standard quantum mechanics in the first 
case and Bohmian mechanics in the second. PCSFT matches well with the dream of A. Einstein 
and L. Infeld for a classical field model of physical reality [49]. As noted above, Einstein 
continued to pursue the project of developing such a model until literally the last days of his life. 
Of course, we cannot know whether Einstein and Infeld would accept PCSFT as one of possible 
realizations of their dream. They might have responded to it similarly to the way Einstein did to 
the Bohmian model (admittedly a particle-model, with a guiding—“pilot”—field, a concept 
originally suggested by L. de Broglie, and derived by him from Einstein’s earlier ideas, 
abandoned by Einstein). Einstein found the Bohmian model interesting, but not in accordance 
with what he thought ideally required, in part because of nonlocality. By contrast, PCSFT is local 
in the same way as a theory of classical fields, such as, the classical electromagnetic field. There 
is no “action at a distance” that one finds in Bohmian theory. However, given that PCSFT 
reproduces the predictions of standard quantum mechanics, which is nonrelativistic, PCSFT is 
also a nonrelativistic theory. The presence of the underlying classical field may be interpreted as 
the presence of an underlying nonlocal structure contributing to correlations, which therefore 
should be considered as nonlocal ones, in the sense of spooky predictions, but not action, at a 
distance as discussed earlier. However, this underlying field is modeled in a fully classical 
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manner, in the way the noisy background is modeled in classical radio-physics. This field’s 
contributions to correlations are purely local, because they are based on field integration in small 
neighborhoods of detectors. Roughly speaking, the problem of locality in PCSFT has the same 
status as it has in classical radio-engineering. 
One may call this underlying classical field the zero point field or vacuum fluctuations. This 
field has a random structure similar to that of random field-signals representing quantum 
systems. Hence, a threshold detector “eats” energy of combined spikes, signals combined with 
the background field. “Non-objectivity,” in the sense of the context-dependence of measurement 
outcomes (they are “objective” in Bohr’s sense, as explained above) of such observables on 
random fields is a consequence of the impossibility in general of assigning, say, polarization up 
or down prior to measurement. As a consequence of the presence of the random background field 
contributing irreducibly into threshold detection, the coincidence clicks appear irrespectively to 
our manipulations with random field-signals representing quantum systems. By the same token, 
this background field contributes to correlations and, in particular, its presence establishes a 
possibility for violating Bell’s inequality, just as quantum mechanics does. Thus observable 
“quantum events,” which are, again, clicks of detectors, cannot be assigned to pre-quantum 
physical systems themselves, which are classical fields [41, 42]. However, these systems have 
their own properties, not found in other quantum models, such as that of the standard quantum 
mechanics or that of Bohmian theories, features that might be, at least in principle, approachable 
and experimentally testable, which would change our conception and knowledge of physical 
reality beyond the quantum. 
It is a safe bet that this conception and knowledge will change in one way or another. But in 
which way will they change? It may not be that different from asking which way an electron will 
go in the double-slit experiment. We can never be certain beforehand in either setup. But then, 
this is still thinking the way we do in quantum physics. We might need something else in physics 
and beyond. 
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